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Torts: A Two-Year Survey
by Jarome E. Gautreaux*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses recent cases decided during the two-year
survey period in the area of torts. 1 It includes cases in most of the areas
of tort law, including medical malpractice, and addresses defenses such
as immunity.
II. IMMUNITY
The scope of county immunity was at issue in Wyno v. Lowndes
County,2 in which the Georgia Supreme Court addressed official
immunity (also called qualified immunity) of county employees. 3 The
case involved a deadly attack by a dog on a neighbor after numerous
complaints were made to the county about the dog. The plaintiff alleged
that the failure of the county employees to take appropriate protective
action prior to the attack was a failure to perform a ministerial act
(thus overcoming the county’s immunity), which is defined as an act
that is simple and specific.4
The court held that the county employees’ actions in determining
what actions to take were discretionary in nature, because “the [policy
at issue] required the [employee] to perform a discretionary act to
determine if the policy was applicable.” 5 The policy at issue vested the
*Partner, Gautreaux Law Firm, Macon, Georgia. Adjunct Professor, Mercer University
School of Law. Mercer University (B.S., 1990); Georgia State University (M.S., 1995);
Mercer University School of Law (J.D., 1998). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. This Article covers the expanded survey period from June 1, 2016 through May
31, 2018 because no survey on this topic appeared in the seventieth volume of the Mercer
Law Review. For an analysis of tort law from the previous survey period, see Christopher
R. Breault et al., Torts, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 69 MERCER L. REV. 299 (2017).
2. 305 Ga. 523, 824 S.E.2d 297 (2019).
3. Id. at 527, 824 S.E.2d at 301.
4. Id. at 528–29, 824 S.E.2d at 302–03 (citing Roper v. Greenway, 294 Ga. 112, 114–
15, 751 S.E.2d 351, 353 (2013)).
5. Id. at 531, 824 S.E.2d at 304 (quoting Grammens v. Dollar, 287 Ga. 618, 621, 697
S.E. 2d 775, 778 (2010)).
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employees with some discretion to determine appropriate actions to
take after complaints of a dangerous dog were received.6
State immunity under the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA) 7 was at
issue in Britt v. Jackson.8 The case arose out of a vehicle accident in
which Britt, a passenger, was injured when the vehicle collided with a
vehicle operated by a Department of Corrections (DOC) employee. At
the time of the wreck, the vehicle operated by the DOC employee was
assisting in a police search for suspects and was attempting to move out
of the way for law enforcement vehicles to apprehend a vehicle in front
of the DOC driver’s vehicle.9
The Georgia Court of Appeals held that these actions were
authorized by DOC policy and thus were within the scope of immunity
afforded by O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(6),10 the provision that extends
immunity to “losses resulting from . . . the method of providing law
enforcement, police, or fire protection.”11
The consequences of not being extremely careful about the use of a
cell phone are illustrated by Stephens v. Coan.12 While working from
home, Stephens accidentally called his supervisor, Coan, at the Georgia
Subsequent Injury Trust Fund, and the supervisor overheard a
conversation between Stephens and his wife, in which Stephens made
remarks about Coan’s job performance.13
Not surprisingly, Coan confronted Stephens upon Stephens’ return to
the office, and Stephens then resigned. Stephens and his wife then
brought claims for invasion of privacy against Coan. 14
The court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal, holding that the
actions taken by Coan—his listening to the call—were taken within the
scope of his official duties with the state.15
In Georgia Department of Administrative Services v. McCoy,16 the
court of appeals considered whether the General Liability Agreement
(GLA) of the State Liability Trust Fund provides coverage for acts of

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 (2019).
348 Ga. App. 159, 819 S.E.2d 677 (2018).
Id. at 159–60, 819 S.E.2d at 678–79.
O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(6) (2019).
Britt, 348 Ga. App. at 163, 819 S.E.2d at 680 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(6)).
349 Ga. App. 147, 825 S.E.2d 525 (2019).
Id. at 147, 149, 825 S.E.2d at 526–27.
Id. at 149, 825 S.E.2d at 527.
Id.
340 Ga. App. 877, 798 S.E.2d 687 (2017).
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malicious prosecution committed by employees of the Department of
Family and Children Services (DFCS).17
The plaintiff, McCoy, had obtained a large judgment against an
employee of DFCS, based on malicious prosecution claims. McCoy then
sought to obtain coverage for the judgment from Department of
Administrative Services (DOAS) under the terms of the GLA. 18
The court of appeals, in its majority opinion, held that there was no
coverage for the claims of malicious prosecution under the GLA.19 To
reach this conclusion, the court reasoned that, first, there were no
claims that the torts were committed within the scope of the
defendant’s employment with the state. 20 This was also admitted at oral
argument.21
The court held that the GLA was clear in providing no coverage for
acts taken by State employees outside the scope of employment.22 The
court rejected the argument by the plaintiff–appellee that there was an
ambiguity in the GLA that should have been read in her favor.23 Two
judges dissented, concluding that the GLA was ambiguous and should
have provided coverage.24
One of the frequently litigated exceptions to state immunity concerns
the negligent design exception found in the GTCA. 25 In Department of
Transportation v. Balamo,26 the court of appeals again addressed a case
involving this exception for a roadway that allowed rainwater to
accumulate and contribute to an automobile wreck. 27
The main problem, according to the court, was that there was no
evidence from the plaintiff’s expert that the design standards in effect
at the time of the design of the roadway were violated, and further, the
expert characterized the problem as a maintenance problem rather
than a design issue.28 In such circumstances, the state was immune.29
One of the most litigated and difficult-to-apply distinctions in
immunity cases is the distinction between ministerial and discretionary
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 877–78, 798 S.E.2d at 689.
Id. at 878, 798 S.E.2d at 689.
Id. at 884, 798 S.E.2d at 693.
Id.
Id. at 882, 798 S.E.2d at 692.
Id.
Id. at 883, 798 S.E.2d at 692.
Id. at 886–87, 798 S.E.2d at 694–95 (Ellington, J., dissenting).
O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(10) (2019).
343 Ga. App. 169, 806 S.E.2d 622 (2017).
Id. at 170–71, 806 S.E.2d at 623–24.
Id. at 173–74, 806 S.E.2d at 626.
Id. at 174, 806 S.E.2d at 626.
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functions. This seems particularly true in cases involving school
districts. In Barnett v. Caldwell,30 a student died as a result of his
injuries when he and another student engaged in horseplay after the
teacher left the classroom. Suit was brought against the teacher, who
argued that she was protected by immunity because her action of
leaving the classroom was a discretionary action.31
The school handbook required that all students be supervised at all
times but did not further explain exactly what constituted
“supervision.” There was testimony that supervision included having an
ability to see the students, which the teacher could not do when she left
the room.32 Nonetheless, the supreme court held that this policy of
constant supervision gave the teacher discretion, even discretion to
simply leave the room, and thus, she was entitled to immunity. 33
III. ANTE LITEM NOTICES
Nearly every survey period includes cases involving alleged defects in
ante litem notices, and this period was no different. The requirements
of ante litem notices apparently continue to vex practitioners.
In Harrell v. City of Griffin,34 the defect at issue was the amount of
the loss claimed.35 O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5(e)36 required the inclusion of an
amount of the damages claimed. 37 No monetary amount, or range of
amounts, was included in the ante litem notice, so the trial court
dismissed the claim, and the court of appeals affirmed.38
The person to whom an ante litem notice must be provided was at
issue in Moats v. Mendez.39 The case arose from an automobile wreck,
and Mendez sued the sheriff of Polk County, Johnny Moats, in his
official capacity, and the deputy sheriff involved in the wreck in her
individual and official capacities.40

30. 302 Ga. 845, 809 S.E.2d 813 (2018).
31. Id. at 845, 809 S.E.2d at 814.
32. Id. at 846–47, 809 S.E.2d at 815–16.
33. Id. at 851, 809 S.E.2d at 818.
34. 346 Ga. App. 635, 816 S.E.2d 738 (2018).
35. Id. at 636, 816 S.E.2d at 740.
36. O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5(e) (2019).
37. Id.
38. Harrell, 346 Ga. App. at 636–37, 816 S.E.2d at 741.
39. 349 Ga. App. 811, 824 S.E.2d 808 (2019), petition for cert. filed, (Apr. 17, 2019)
(No. 19-1095).
40. Id. at 811, 824 S.E.2d at 809.
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An ante litem notice was provided to the County via service on the
Chairman of the Board of Commissioners, but no ante litem notice was
sent to the Sheriff.41
A splintered court of appeals held that the ante litem notice was not
proper because it was not served on the Sheriff, who is considered a
separate constitutional entity from the County, and thus, entitled to a
separate ante litem notice.42 Many practitioners were likely surprised
by this result, since sheriffs are often considered part of the counties
they serve.
Whether an ante litem notice is sufficient if presented to a county
attorney employed by the county in-house, as opposed to an attorney
privately employed but appointed as the county attorney, was resolved
in Croy v. Whitfield County.43 After an automobile wreck, a suit was
brought against Whitfield County. The ante litem notice was served on
the county attorney, who was not a county employee but was appointed
as the county attorney.44
The supreme court held that this notice was sufficient. 45 The
supreme court rejected the distinction drawn by the court of appeals, at
least for ante litem notices, between in-house county attorneys and
those appointed as county attorneys but privately employed.46
The requirements of ante litem notices to municipalities continue to
be the subject of appellate court scrutiny. In Williams v. City of
Atlanta,47 the court of appeals held that a pedestrian’s ante litem notice
was insufficient, and thus, affirmed the grant of summary judgment to
the City.48
The pedestrian alleged that he fell into an uncovered water meter
hole and was injured. He sent an ante litem notice specifying an
address that later turned out to not have a water meter.49 Also, in the
litigation, the address of the incident was different from the address
specified in the ante litem notice, and the two locations were
approximately 0.3 miles apart.50 The court focused on the fact that the

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 812, 824 S.E.2d at 810.
Id. at 816–18, 824 S.E.2d at 812–14.
301 Ga. 380, 801 S.E.2d 892 (2017).
Id. at 380, 801 S.E.2d at 893.
Id. at 386, 801 S.E.2d at 896–97.
Id.
342 Ga. App. 470, 803 S.E.2d 614 (2017).
Id. at 473, 803 S.E.2d at 617.
Id. at 470–71, 803 S.E.2d at 615.
Id.
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incorrect address did not provide sufficient information for the City to
have conducted an investigation into the claims. 51
IV. FOOD POISONING
The Georgia Supreme Court clarified the burden on non-movants
facing summary judgment motions in food poisoning cases in Patterson
v. Kevon, LLC.52 The facts arose from food—alleged to contain
pathogens and to be undercooked—that plaintiffs consumed at a
wedding reception.53 The problem was the one faced in many such
cases: which food caused the problems that began a few days later? In
this case, the caterer, Big Kev’s, produced testimony that they had safe
food-handling procedures and that other guests did not become ill. The
plaintiffs produced evidence that some other guests did in fact become
ill, and the plaintiffs tested positive for salmonella. 54
The supreme court reviewed many past decisions of the court of
appeals and pointed out that there is no special causation proof
requirement that applies to food poisoning cases at the summary
judgment stage.55 Instead, like other negligence cases, food poisoning
cases require adequate proof, even if circumstantial, to get past
summary judgment.56 Thus, simply saying “I ate food and later got sick”
likely does not suffice, but neither would a plaintiff be required to
disprove every other possible cause of the maladies she suffered.
V. PREMISES LIABILITY
Many practitioners may have been surprised at how what appeared
to be an ordinary negligence case—a person tripping over a concrete
wheel stop—morphed into a case requiring expert design testimony in
Bartenfeld v. Chick-Fil-A.57 In that case, a patron of Chick-Fil-A was
walking back to her vehicle when she tripped over a concrete wheel
stop. Claims of negligence based on the design of the wheel stops were
brought, along with ordinary negligence claims. The trial court rejected
both claims and granted summary judgment to the defendants because
there was no expert testimony that the wheel stop was a hazardous
condition.58
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 473, 803 S.E.2d at 616.
304 Ga. 232, 818 S.E.2d 575 (2018).
Id. at 233, 818 S.E.2d at 576.
Id. at 233, 818 S.E.2d at 576–77.
Id. at 237, 818 S.E.2d at 579.
Id. at 240, 818 S.E.2d at 581.
346 Ga. App. 759, 815 S.E.2d 273 (2018).
Id. at 760–61, 815 S.E.2d at 276.
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The court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment,
holding that the claim based on the design of the parking lot was a
claim for professional negligence, requiring expert testimony. 59 An open
question is whether this holding will open the door to transforming
many seemingly ordinary premises liability cases into professional
negligence cases.
VI. MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE
In Tenet Health System GB Inc. v. Thomas,60 the supreme court
affirmed the court of appeals in a medical malpractice case. 61 In that
case, the patient suffered quadriplegia after a c-collar was removed
while her neck was fractured. Suit was filed prior to expiration of the
statute of limitations and then amended after the passing of the statute
of limitations to add claims based on the nurse’s removal of the
c-collar.62 Even though a new legal theory of imputed negligence was
asserted in the amended complaint, and new persons were alleged to be
negligent, the court held that the claims related back to the date of
filing of the original complaint under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15.63
There always seem to be cases involving expert affidavits in medical
malpractice cases, and this year includes them as well. In Holmes v.
Lyons,64 the adequacy of an expert’s affidavit in a gynecological surgery
case was at issue.65 The main claim in that case was that the surgeon
had physical disabilities that prevented him from doing the surgery
properly, resulting in an ureteral injury.66 There was nothing in the
affidavit that specifically detailed exactly how the damage was done
during the surgery, but instead it was alleged that the surgery was
botched due to the surgeon’s physical difficulties.67 The court held that
the affidavit was adequate, considering that the appropriate standard
required drawing all inferences in favor of the adequacy of the
affidavit.68

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 763–65, 815 S.E.2d at 278–79.
304 Ga. 86, 816 S.E.2d 627 (2018).
Id. at 86, 816 S.E.2d 628.
Id. at 86–88, 816 S.E.2d at 628–29.
Id. at 93–94, 816 S.E.2d at 632–33 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15 (2019)).
346 Ga. App. 99, 815 S.E.2d 252 (2018), cert. granted, (Mar. 11, 2019).
Id. at 100, 815 S.E.2d at 254.
Id. at 100–01, 815 S.E.2d at 254–55.
Id. at 103–04, 815 S.E.2d at 256–57.
Id. at 103–04, 815 S.E.2d at 256.
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VII.DEFAMATION
The Georgia courts issued several opinions in defamation cases
during the survey period. In Smith v. DiFrancesco,69 a physician
brought a defamation claim against another physician based on a letter
sent to patients that included the phrase, “since [plaintiff] last had the
ability to practice medicine.”70
The trial court granted summary judgment, concluding that the
statement was not libel per se, which, unlike libel per quod, requires no
extrinsic facts to establish its defamatory meaning. 71 On appeal, the
defendant argued that this phrase could have meant that the plaintiff
had simply lost the ability to practice medicine with the company he
left.72
The court of appeals rejected the defendant’s argument and held that
this statement was libel per se, and further held that the statement was
not privileged.73 The main issue regarding privilege was whether the
statement was made in good faith, which the court determined should
have been left for the jury to find, particularly since the plaintiff had
never lost his license or his ability to practice medicine.74
The difficulty of succeeding in claims brought by public figures for
defamation was illustrated in Ladner v. New World Communications of
Atlanta.75 Ladner was a police officer for the city of Holly Springs,
Georgia. He completed an application to participate in an event for
wounded veterans in Midland, Texas, which included a parade in which
Ladner and his wife participated by riding on one of the floats. The float
was involved in a collision with a train, and Ladner’s wife was seriously
injured.76
There were further reports in the news media about Ladner’s wife’s
recovery, and some of those reports mentioned that Ladner had
received a Purple Heart. Later, family members contacted the press and
told them that Ladner had not received a Purple Heart. An Atlanta
news station did several reports, relying on military documents that did
not indicate Ladner received a Purple Heart. 77

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

341 Ga. App. 786, 802 S.E.2d 69 (2017).
Id. at 787, 802 S.E.2d at 71.
Id. at 788, 802 S.E.2d at 72.
Id. at 789, 802 S.E.2d at 72.
Id. at 789, 791, 802 S.E.2d at 72, 74.
Id. at 790, 802 S.E.2d at 73.
343 Ga. App. 449, 806 S.E.2d 905 (2017).
Id. at 449–50, 806 S.E.2d at 908–09.
Id. at 450–52, 806 S.E.2d at 909–10.
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Ladner brought a defamation action, and the news station sought
summary judgment on the grounds that Ladner was a public figure and
that there was no showing of actual malice by the reporter. 78 Summary
judgment was granted, and the court of appeals affirmed. 79
The court of appeals focused on the public interest in the various
events in the case, including the initial trip to Midland, Texas, the
accident, Ladner’s medical needs, and fundraising on their behalf. 80
These various activities, and the public interest in them, supported a
finding that Ladner was a public figure.81
The court also held that there was no showing of actual malice, based
in large part on the reporter’s many investigative activities, including
obtaining documents and statements from several people about
Ladner’s military service.82
VIII.WRONGFUL DEATH
The issue of causation and intervening acts was addressed by the
Georgia Supreme Court in Jordan v. Everson,83 a case involving the
death of a man released from the hospital after being admitted because
he was hearing voices and hallucinating.84
The patient was discharged, and his parents decided to take him to
Duke University Hospital. During the trip to Duke, he jumped from the
vehicle and ran down the highway, where he was struck and killed by
another vehicle.85
Suit was brought against the emergency room physician, who sought
summary judgment on the grounds that there was not a sufficient
causal link between his alleged misconduct and the death. 86
The supreme court held that an intervening act does not need to be
“wrongful or negligent” in order to break the causal chain between the
original tortfeasor’s acts and the result; instead, the act must merely be
either reasonably foreseeable or triggered by the defendant’s conduct. 87
Thus, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals on this point,

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 452, 806 S.E.2d at 910.
Id. at 461, 806 S.E.2d at 915.
Id. at 455–56, 806 S.E.2d at 912–13.
Id. at 456, 806 S.E.2d at 913.
Id. at 459–60, 806 S.E.2d at 915.
302 Ga. 364, 806 S.E.2d 533 (2017).
Id. at 364, 806 S.E.2d at 534.
Id.
Id. at 364, 806 S.E.2d at 533.
Id. at 365, 806 S.E.2d at 534.
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because the court of appeals concluded that the intervening act must be
wrongful or negligent to break the causal chain.88
The Georgia Supreme Court addressed wrongful death damages in
Bibbs v. Toyota Motor Corp.89 In that case, the injured person’s
guardian settled her very serious personal injury claim, and then
twenty years later the injured person died. The settlement documents
expressly stated that any wrongful death claims were not released by
the release in the personal injury case.90 After a very long and thorough
analysis, the court concluded that in this case the only type of damages
the plaintiff would be permitted to recover would be the damages for
the intangible value of the decedent’s death, even though she had been
in a coma for twenty years at the time of her death. 91
IX. CONCLUSION
The Georgia Supreme Court and the Georgia Court of Appeals
addressed many tort cases over the latest survey period, in areas that
seem to always receive appellate scrutiny, such as immunity and
medical negligence, and in some areas of tort law that are not as often
addressed in appellate cases, such as food poisoning and defamation.

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 365–66, 806 S.E.2d at 534.
304 Ga. 68, 815 S.E.2d 850 (2018).
Id. at 69, 815 S.E.2d at 852.
Id. at 81, 815 S.E.2d at 860.

